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Research has shown that academic risk taking—the selection of school tasks 
with varying difficulty levels—affords important implications for educational 
outcomes. In two experiments, we explored the role of cognitive processes—
specifically, global versus local processing styles—in students’ academic risk 
taking tendencies. Participants first read a short passage, which provided the 
context for their subsequent academic risk taking decisions. Following which, 
participants undertook the Navon’s task and attended to either global letters or 
local letters only, i.e., were either globally- or locally-primed. The effects of 
priming on academic risk taking were then assessed using a perception-based 
measure (Experiment 1) and a task-based measure (Experiment 2). Experiment 
1 provided preliminary evidence, which Experiment 2 confirmed, that 
globally-focused individuals took more academic risk than did locally-focused 
individuals after controlling for participants’ need for cognition (how much 
they enjoy effortful cognitive activities). Additionally, the inclusion of and 
comparisons with a control group in Experiment 2 revealed that locally-
focused participants drove the observed effects. The theory of predictive and 
reactive control systems (PARCS) provides a cogent account of our findings. 
Future directions and implications in education are discussed. 
  
Keywords: Academic risk taking; Global-local processing; Navon’s task; Need 
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In academic settings, students often have to decide between a harder or 
an easier assignment to work on, an unfamiliar or a familiar module to enrol 
in, or even sharing or not sharing one’s tentative ideas in class. These 
decisions can be regarded as specific instances of academic risk taking. There 
are two broad ideas associated with academic risk taking. First, as with most 
types of risk taking (e.g., physical, economic), academic risk taking manifests 
when students can choose from a range of possible options. Second, these 
options are accompanied by undesirable consequences that are unique to the 
academic setting, e.g., students who choose to share their ideas in class may 
risk having their ideas dismissed or ridiculed by others (Beghetto, 2009). 
Clifford (1991) defines academic risk taking specifically as the selection of 
academic tasks which vary in their levels of difficulty. The view is that 
choosing a more difficult academic task reflects greater academic risk taking, 
as it increases one’s likelihood of making mistakes, or obtaining a lower score, 
on the task.   
Academic risk taking is important in education as it has implications 
for a range of learning processes and outcomes. In theory, the student who 
takes more academic risks may, in the longer term, benefit from greater self-
efficacy (Bandura, 1977), heightened intrinsic motivation (Deci & Porac, 
1978), an experience of “flow” or moment-to-moment task involvement 
(Csfikszentmihalyi, 1990), as well as optimal cognitive development (e.g., 
Vygotsky, 1978). Such students are also likely to put more effort into 
performing their academic tasks (e.g., Clifford & Chou, 1991). Furthermore, 
students who participated in a risk-based learning game reported higher 




classroom engagement, and demonstrated superior long-term retention of 
course material (Devonshire et al., 2014). In light of these potential 
advantages, researchers have sought to understand academic risk taking and 
explore the conditions under which it can be promoted (e.g., Clifford, 1991; 
Beghetto, 2009).  
Past studies have largely investigated external (situational) factors that 
may influence student’s academic risk taking. For example, students were 
found to take more academic risks when the academic tasks came with 
variable payoffs (i.e., higher points awarded for problems with increasing 
difficulty), and when the tasks were presented as a game rather than a test 
(e.g., Clifford & Chou, 1991). Fewer studies have, however, investigated 
internal factors that may influence students’ academic risk taking, e.g., 
students with greater interest in Science displayed greater academic risk taking 
tendencies when learning science (Beghetto, 2009). Importantly, no study has 
explored the potentially interesting role of internal cognitive processes, such 
as global-local processing, in influencing students’ academic risk taking. The 
present study aims to address that gap, thereby providing a new cognitive 
psychological perspective on the promotion of academic risk taking, and 
sparking new ways of thinking about cognitive educational research and its 
applications. The theory of Predictive and Reactive Control Systems 
(PARCS), in particular, serves as a cogent framework for this research.  
 
The Theory of Predictive and Reactive Control Systems (PARCS) 
The theory of PARCS (Tops, Boksem, Luu, & Tucker, 2010; Tops, 
Boksem, Quirin, IJzerman, & Koole, 2014) offers an evolutionary view of 




human cognition. Under such a view, the features of human cognition are 
conceived in terms of their adaptive functions i.e., how they can enact 
behaviors which can in turn promote our survival. Advancing Tucker’s 
seminal work (e.g., Tucker & Williamson, 1984; Derryberry & Tucker, 1994), 
the theory of PARCS posits human cognition as comprising two distinct 
control systems—namely the “predictive control” and “reactive control” 
systems1. Each control system is dominant under different circumstances, and 
the features within each control system work together to enact behaviors 
which are adaptive under the respective circumstances (Tops et al., 2010; 
2014).  
The predictive control system is dominant under familiar, predictable 
circumstances. The features associated with this system include global 
processing, low emotional intensity, and an extended temporal focus. All these 
features allow an individual to adopt a futuristic orientation and to engage in 
exploratory behaviors. The individual is thus likely to seek out and build 
resources, thereby promoting his survival in the long term (see, also, the 
broaden-and-build theory in Fredrickson, 1998). Conversely, the reactive 
control system takes over under novel, unpredictable circumstances, such as 
when one faces an imminent threat from a predator. The features associated 
with this system include local processing, high emotional intensity, and an 
immediate temporal focus. These cognitive features focus an individual’s 
attention on the here and now (see, also, Easterbrooks’ hypothesis in 
                                                          
1 Following Tops et al. (2010; 2014), we wish to emphasize that the two distinct, 
control systems are not organized around the concepts “predictive” or “reactive”. 
Rather, the terms “predictive” and “reactive” are used as labels for functional systems 
that are organized, really, on the basis of their controlling behaviors that are adaptive 
under different circumstances. 




Easterbrook, 1959), and ensues in vigilant behaviors which can ensure one’s 
security and survival. 
Notably, the theory of PARCS has been informed by, and interpreted 
with, established neuroscientific findings (see Tops et al., 2010, for a 
comprehensive review). Furthermore, a consistent pattern arises when one 
turns to empirical, behavioral reports. Features which come under the 
predictive control system like global processing, positive affect, and a 
promotion focus were found to be positively associated (e.g., Basso, Schefft, 
Ris, & Dember, 1996; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Förster & Higgins, 
2005). Similarly, features which come under the reactive control system like 
local processing, anxiety, and a prevention focus were also found to be 
positively related (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 1998; Förster & Higgins, 2005).  
The overarching nature and extensive reach of this theory thus allows 
us to potentially explore many cognitive features which might be related to 
students’ academic risk taking. In this study, we focus specifically on global-
local processing as the key variable of interest.  
 
Global-Local Processing 
People can attend to the same stimuli in different ways. For example, 
when looking at a scene, people can adopt a broad perceptual focus and take in 
the “big picture” or assume a narrow perceptual focus and attend to the 
individual elements. These are known as global and local processing styles, 
respectively. Processing styles can be experimentally manipulated, i.e., they 
can be induced in the course of a task and be carried over to subsequent tasks 
(Liberman, Förster, & Friedman, 2007). A key paradigm to induce global-




local processing is the Navon’s (1977) letter task (e.g., Dale & Arnell, 2013; 
Milne & Szczerbinski, 2009). A typical Navon stimulus comprises a larger 
letter that is built out of smaller letters of identical size (see Figure 1 for 
examples). In a typical priming task, individuals are presented with a series of 
Navon stimuli and instructed to repeatedly identify either the large letter or the 
small letter. Repeatedly identifying the large letter induces global processing, 
whereas repeatedly identifying the small letter induces local processing (see, 
also, Lim & Goh, 2013). Global versus local processing styles have been 
successfully induced in various studies via this approach, and were found to 
differentially impact such subsequent tasks as face recognition (Macrae & 
Lewis, 2002), eyewitness identification (Perfect, Dennis, & Snell, 2007), and 
golf-putting performance (Lewis & Dawkins, 2015).  
Notably, global-local processing is a cognitive process that has been 
extensively studied. It can be elicited by a wide range of variables, 
including—but not limited to—mood, approach/ avoidance cues, regulatory 
focus, and culture (see Forster & Dannenberg, 2010 for a review). Since the 
impetus behind this work is to explore factors that could encourage greater 
academic risk taking, studying global-local processing can offer us an initial 
springboard through which these other related variables could then be studied. 
On the basis of PARCS theory, one may expect global versus local 
processing to be systematically associated with different manifest behaviours. 
In particular, global processing may favour exploratory behaviors whereas 
local processing may favour vigilant behaviors. Lim, Yuen, and Tong (2015) 
directly tested this idea. Specifically, they investigated the influence of global-  





Figure 1. Examples of Navon stimuli. 
  




local processing on generic risk-taking behaviors assessed through the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Taking (BART) task. In the BART task, for each succeeding 
balloon pump that participants make, they would be able to increase their 
economic rewards but would, at the same time, inflate the risk of bursting the 
balloon (and hence not obtaining any rewards at all). Thus, making more 
balloon pumps reflects a behavioural bias towards exploration over vigilance. 
Consistent with the theory of PARCS, Lim et al. (2015) found that globally-
focused participants, who likely prioritized exploration through the activation 
of the predictive control system, made more balloon pumps, i.e., took more 
risk than did locally-focused participants. In light of the findings, that 
globally-focused participants would presumably take more academic risk than 
would locally-focused participants is a promising hypothesis. 
 
Need for Cognition 
When faced with ambiguity, one’s personality trait is also likely to 
influence one’s risk-taking tendencies (e.g., Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000; 
Demaree, DeDonno, Burns, & Everhart, 2008), although different personality 
traits may, of course, be involved in different domains of risk-taking (e.g., 
Weller & Tikir, 2011). In the context of academic risk, one’s need for 
cognition (NFC) could potentially influence one’s academic risk taking 
tendencies. NFC is a stable, personality trait defined as the extent to which an 
individual enjoys effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & 
Jarvis, 1996). Of particular relevance to this study is the finding that 
individuals high in NFC reported higher intrinsic motivation to engage in 
effortful cognitive endeavours than did individuals low in NFC (Amabile, Hill, 




Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994). Furthermore, students high in NFC expressed 
significantly lower stress and anxiety insofar as academic challenges are 
concerned (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1984; Jarvis & Petty, 1996). We expect, on 
the basis of these previous reports, one’s NFC to influence his or her academic 




In the present experiment, we seek to explore the influence of global-
local processing on students’ academic risk taking tendencies. To this end, we 
manipulated global or local processing using Navon’s letter task, and 
examined the impact of processing styles on participants’ academic risk 
taking, operationalized as their preferred level of challenge across three 
academic scenarios. We further included NFC as a potential covariate. In line 
with the theory of PARCS, we hypothesized that participants who attended to 
global letters would take more academic risk than would participants who 




A total of 69 undergraduate students (34 female) aged 19 to 27 (M = 
22.01, SD = 2.03) from the National University of Singapore took part in the 
study for course credit or cash incentive. Participants were randomly assigned 
to either the global (N = 34) or local (N = 35) processing condition. 
 





Participants underwent the experiment either individually or in groups 
of no more than five. When in groups, participants were seated separately so 
that they could not communicate with, nor monitor the activities of, other 
participants. Each session lasted about 30 min. Participants first read a short 
text Tropisms for 4 min, after which they filled out a meta-comprehension 
Questionnaire. Next, participants undertook the Navon’s letter task and 
completed either the global or the local priming task, before they responded to 
the Academic Risk Taking Scenarios. Participants then recalled freely (i.e., 
without any cues) the text Tropisms in 8 min. Finally, participants completed a 
NFC scale. They were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 
Materials 
Text. A science text titled Tropisms was used (see Appendix A; Cook 
& Mayer, 1988). It contained 263 words, with a Flesch Reading Ease score of 
62.4 (score ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 signifying complete reading ease) 
and a Flesch-Kincaid grade level of 8.3. Importantly, this text provided the 
context for which participants subsequently made their academic risk taking 
decisions. In addition, participants’ memory of the text was assessed, and 
subsequently controlled for, via a free recall task2. 
Meta-comprehension Questionnaire. A questionnaire comprising 
eight meta-comprehension items was administered (see Appendix B). These 
items measure various factors that may influence participants’ academic risk 
                                                          
2 Individuals who remembered more information from the text may, as a result of 
greater confidence or familiarity, take more academic risk. We wanted to rule out this 
possibility. 




taking, including judgments of text, as in (1) how interesting the text was, and 
(2) how readable the text was; judgments of learning, as in (3) how confident 
participants were of the text, and (4) how well they thought they could 
remember the text; motivation, as in (5) how engrossed participants were in 
reading the text, and (6) how many times they read the text; and, finally, prior 
knowledge, as in (7) how much information in the text participants knew prior 
to reading it, and (8) how well they knew the subject matter covered in the text 
prior to reading it. Except for item (6) which documented simple frequency 
counts, participants rated all items on a 7-point Likert scale, with higher scores 
indicating more favourable responses. Since participants are making their 
academic risk taking decisions based on the text, measuring—and controlling 
for—these meta-comprehension items will help us factor in participants’ 
idiosyncratic responses to the text. This will allow us to more accurately 
explore the effects of global-local processing on academic risk taking.  
Navon’s Letter Task. The Navon’s task was administered on a color 
monitor with 1920 × 1080 screen resolution, via the software DirectRT (Jarvis, 
2004). Viewing distance ranged from 60 to 70 cm. Following Förster and 
Higgins (2005), each global letter was approximately 2.1 cm × 2.1 cm, while 
each local letter was approximately 0.4 cm × 0.4 cm. Local letters were 
arranged on an imaginary 5-letter × 5-letter grid of presentation. Across both 
the global and local conditions, the letters H and L were designated as targets. 
Participants were to press the H key on the keyboard if a composite stimulus 
contained the letter H, and the L key if it contained the letter L. In the global 
condition, participants saw composite stimuli in which the target letters always 
appeared at the global level (a H made of Fs, a H made of Ts, an L made of Fs, 




or an L made of Ts). Conversely, those in the local condition saw composite 
stimuli in which the target letters always appeared at the local level (an F 
made of Hs, an F made of Ls, a T made of Hs, or a T made of Ls). In both 
conditions, each of the four composite stimuli had an equal chance of being 
presented. These composite stimuli can be found in Figure 2. 
In a typical trial, participants were first presented with a fixation cross 
at the centre of the screen for 500 ms. Following which, a composite stimulus 
appeared, substituting the cross. Participants were tasked to identify target 
letters within the composite stimulus as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Notably, participants in the global condition consistently identified global 
letters, whereas those in the local condition consistently identified local letters. 
Each participant completed 12 practice trials, followed by 120 test trials, 
which lasted 5 min altogether. This duration was consistent with that used in 
previous studies which successfully demonstrated global-local priming (e.g., 
Lewis & Dawkins, 2015; Perfect et al., 2007).  
Academic Risk Taking Scenarios. Research on academic risk taking 
dates back to the pioneering work of Clifford and colleagues (e.g., Clifford, 
1991). To measure academic risk taking experimentally, these researchers 
created tasks like Academic Risk Taking (Clifford, 1988) and Cognitive Skills 
Risk Taking (Clifford, Lan, Chou, & Qi, 1989). In these tasks, participants—
usually elementary or high school students—were presented with one set of 
multiple-choice questions for each of the various domains (e.g., mathematics, 
vocabulary). These questions were selected from retired standardized 
achievement tests, and presented in order of increasing grades, i.e., difficulty.  





Figure 2. Composite stimuli used in the global and local conditions. 
 
  




Participants were typically asked to choose and work on a portion (15-20%) of 
these questions. The average difficulty level of the chosen questions was then 
derived to reflect academic risk taking, with greater difficulty indicating 
higher risk taking. Crucially, these tasks utilized standardized achievement test 
questions which, while common at the elementary level, are rare at the college 
level—our level of interest.  
To address this, we devised a scenario-based measure of academic risk 
taking which reflects students’ academic experience in college and retains the 
essence of earlier measures. Specifically, participants were presented with 
three hypothetical academic scenarios that undergraduate students typically 
encounter: tutorial class discussion, group project, and individual assignment 
(see Appendix C). In the ‘individual assignment’ scenario, for example, 
students were asked:  
 
“Imagine you will be working on a piece of individual assignment. 
The assignment will be regarding the topic you read about a while 
ago. You can choose from one of seven assignment questions to work 
on. The assignment questions range from 1 (least challenging) to 7 
(most challenging).”  
 
For each of these scenarios, participants were required to choose their 
preferred level of challenge on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “least challenging”; 
7 = “most challenging”). Participants’ preferred level of challenge across the 
three academic scenarios significantly correlated, rs = .58 – .61, ps < .001, 
indicating considerable consistency. An academic risk-taking score, ART, was 




hence derived for each participant by averaging their responses across all three 
scenarios (α = .81).  
NFC Scale. NFC was assessed using the well-established 18-item 
short NFC Scale (see Appendix D; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; Cacioppo 
& Petty, 1982). Participants rated all items on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
“strongly disagree”; 7 = “strongly agree”). Example items include “I find 
satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours” and “thinking is not my 
idea of fun”. Nine of the items were negatively worded, and were reverse-
coded prior to any analysis, such that higher scores indicated higher NFC for 
all items. The NFC scale was subjected to a principal component analysis that 
resulted in the extraction of one factor. This single NFC factor yielded a 
coefficient alpha of .89 and accounted for 34% of the variance in the NFC 
items. A NFC score was then computed for each participant by averaging their 
responses across all 18 items. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analyses 
The descriptive statistics of the main measures are summarized in 
Table 1. Participants’ ART scores ranged from 1 to 7 (M = 4.77 and SD = 
1.36), and their NFC scores ranged from 2.83 to 6.50, (M = 4.65 and SD = 
0.82). Importantly, participants’ ART scores significantly correlated with their 
NFC scores, r = .62, p < .001, confirming that NFC was a covariate. 
Participants’ ART scores also correlated with five of the eight meta-
comprehension items, namely, interest, readability, confidence, memory, and 
engrossment, rs = .24 – .53, ps < .05. These items were subsequently  
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6-21 0.30 -0.36 .13 
 
Note: Significance codes: <.001 ***; <.01 **; <.05*. 
 
  




controlled for in our main analyses. Notably, the kurtosis and skewness values 
of the main measures all fell within the range of ±2 (see Table 1), wherein 
normality is assumed (George & Mallery, 2010). This provided the 
justification to proceed with our main analyses.  
 
Main Analyses 
 The dataset was submitted to a one-way Analysis of Covariance3 
(ANCOVA) with ART as the dependent variable, Group (global or local) as 
the independent variable, and NFC as the covariate. The interaction term NFC 
× Group was not statistically significant, F(1, 65) = .11, p = .75, fulfilling the 
homogeneity of slopes assumption. In other words, the relationship between 
NFC and ART does not differ between the global and local groups. This in turn 
allows us to adjust, and subsequently compare, the mean ART for each group 
according to their respective mean NFC scores. Controlling for NFC, globally-
focused individuals did not differ from locally-focused individuals in terms of 
their academic risk taking, Msadj = 4.97 vs. 4.59 respectively, F(1, 66) = 2.0, p 
= .16, ηp2= .029. Including the five covariates of non-interest (i.e., interest, 
readability, confidence, memory, and engrossment) in the existing ANCOVA 
model yielded a similar result, Msadj = 4.93 vs. 4.62 respectively, F(1, 61) = 
1.46, p = .23, ηp2 = .023. 
Our initial findings, while in the predicted direction, revealed a small 
effect size. A possible reason for this observation relates to the presence of 
                                                          
3 Based on feedback from one of the examiners, on top of ANCOVA models, we 
have submitted the dataset (in both experiments) to one-way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) models with ART as the dependent variable and Group as the independent 
variable. We wish to refer readers to Appendix I for results and discussion on these 
ANOVA models,  




outliers, which can markedly influence and distort a study’s true results (e.g., 
Aguinis Gottfredson, & Joo, 2013; Bollen & Jackmans, 1990). Following 
Bollen and Jackmans’ (1990) recommendation on outlier diagnostics (e.g., 
Cook’s distance) and cut-off criterion, we subsequently identified and 
excluded five outlying observations from our dataset4. The trimmed dataset (N 
= 64; global = 32; local = 32) was then re-submitted to the same ANCOVA. 
The interaction term NFC × Group was not significant, F(1, 60) = .88, p = .35, 
fulfilling the homogeneity of slopes assumption. Controlling for participants’ 
NFC, globally-focused individuals took significantly more academic risk than 
did locally-focused individuals, Msadj = 5.19 vs. 4.63 respectively, F(1, 61) = 
5.73, p = .020, ηp2 = .086. This observation persisted even after controlling for 
the five covariates of non-interest, Msadj = 5.13 vs. 4.68 respectively, F(1, 56) 
= 4.82, p = .032, ηp2 = .079. 
In this experiment, we tested the hypothesis that globally-focused 
individuals would take more academic risk relative to locally-focused 
individuals. The data provided preliminary support for our hypothesis, 
following the exclusion of five influential outliers. The existing literature on 
priming, which suggests that the effects may manifest in such various forms as 
one’s perception, behaviors, and/ or goals (see Loersch & Payne, 2011), offers 
a possible interpretation. In our current measure of academic risk taking, 
participants made choices based on hypothetical scenarios but did not actually 
act on their choices. Research has shown that hypothetical choices may differ 
from choices that entail real actions and consequences, both behaviorally (e.g., 
                                                          
4 Influential outliers were identified based on Cook’s distance, with a recommended 
cutoff value of 4/N = 0.058. We wish to refer readers to Appendix E for more specific 
details of the outlier diagnostics. 




Lafferty & Higbee, 1974) and at the neuronal activation level (e.g., Kang, 
Rangel, Camus, & Camerer, 2011). This could have underpinned the present 
preliminary findings. To ascertain whether this was the case, we designed a 
second experiment in which a task-based measure (involving participants’ 
actual behavioural responses) was administered.   
 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we adopted the same paradigm from Experiment 1, 
but with two key revisions. Firstly, an ecologically relevant task-based (vs. 
perception-based) measure of academic risk taking, which entailed real actions 
and consequences for participants, was employed. We hypothesized that 
globally-focused individuals would take more academic risk than would 
locally-focused individuals, whilst controlling for NFC. Secondly, a control 
condition was now included, in order to ascertain whether the priming effects, 




A total of 116 undergraduate students (71 female) aged 18 to 26 (M = 
21.99, SD = 1.65) from the National University of Singapore took part in the 
study for cash incentive. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
three conditions: global (N = 38), local (N = 38), or control (N = 40).  
 
  





Participants first read a text Is Science Dangerous? for 5 min, after 
which they filled out a meta-comprehension Questionnaire. Next, participants 
underwent one of three conditions: global priming, local priming, or the 
control condition. Immediately after that, participants responded to a new 
academic risk taking task. Finally, participants completed the NFC scale, with 
participants in the control condition additionally completing the SFT scale as 
well as the academic risk taking scenarios used in Experiment 1. All 
participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation. In 
particular, participants were probed during debrief, and none of them 
suspected, at the point of their decision making, that there was only one 
common set of questions assigned to all participants regardless of their 
personal decisions. We checked that no one was dismayed by the deception.  
 
Materials 
Text. A sample reading comprehension text from the International 
English Language Test System was used (IELTS, 2015). Titled Is Science 
Dangerous, the text is an excerpt from a scientific article (see Appendix F; 
Wolpert, 2002). It contained 800 words, with a Flesch Reading Ease score of 
46.8 and a Flesch-Kincaid grade level of 11.0. As in Experiment 1, this text 
provided the context for which participants subsequently make their academic 
risk taking decisions. Furthermore, this text was accompanied by a common 
set of 12 comprehension questions (see Appendix G), which all participants 
were assigned regardless of their personal decisions.  




Navon’s Letter Task. Both the global and local processing conditions 
were identical to those in Experiment 1. For the control condition, all 
parameters (e.g., number of trials, duration, target letters) were identical to the 
other two conditions, except for the neutral stimuli presented, which 
comprised only single-level Hs and Ls, without any global or local elements. 
Each single-level letter was 1.2 cm × 1.2 cm, averaging between the sizes of a 
global letter and a local letter (see Figure 3).  
Academic Risk Taking Task. Participants were first informed that 
they would be working on a set of text-relevant questions in the next ten mins. 
They were then tasked to choose one out of seven sets of questions to work on. 
Participants were led to believe that these seven sets of questions differed in 
their level of challenge on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “least challenging”; 7 = 
“most challenging”), when, in fact, all participants were eventually assigned 
the same set of questions regardless of their decisions. The levels of challenge 
that participants selected constituted their respective ART scores. 
NFC Scale. The NFC scale was subjected to a principal component 
analysis, resulting in the extraction of one factor (α = .89), which accounted 
for 33% of the variance in the NFC items. A NFC score was then computed 
for each participant by averaging his or her responses across all 18 items. 
School Failure Tolerance (SFT) Scale. The 36-item SFT scale 
measures, through self-report, the extent to which an individual responds to 
failures in a school context (see Appendix H; Clifford, 1988). It comprises 
three subscales—namely, affect (α = .87), action (α = .75), and preferred 
difficulty (α = .87), each with 12 items. Importantly, the preferred difficulty  





Figure 3. Single-level stimuli used in the neutral condition. 
 
  




subscale, in particular, demonstrated modest correlations with the previously 
established Academic Risk Taking measure (Clifford, 1988). Here, the SFT 
was administered for the purpose of validating the academic risk taking 
measures employed in the present study.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analyses 
The inclusion of a control condition in the present experiment allows 
us to collect data to preliminarily assess the consistency and validity of our 
current measures of academic risk taking5. The task-based and perception-
based measures were significantly correlated, r = .68, p < .001, indicating high 
consistency. In addition, the preferred difficulty score in SFT correlated with 
the task-based and perception-based measures, r = .28, p = .077; and r = .48, p 
= .0018, respectively. Taken together, the validation results suggest that our 
existing measures are not only internally consistent, but also exhibit partial 
consistency with previous measures of academic risk taking. 
The descriptive statistics of the main measures are summarized in 
Table 2. Participants’ ART scores ranged from 1 to 7 (M = 4.84 and SD = 
1.54), and their NFC scores ranged from 1.50 to 6.50 (M = 4.36 and SD = 
0.75). Importantly, participants’ ART scores significantly correlated with their 
NFC scores, r = .39, p < .001. Participants’ ART scores also correlated with six 
of the eight meta-comprehension items: interest, readability, confidence, 
memory, engrossment, and prior text knowledge, rs = .21 – .42, ps < .05.  
                                                          
5 Validation data was not collected from participants assigned to either the global or 
local condition because their ART scores, under the influence of priming, would 
likely not constitute “true” scores.  




Table 2.  
 




Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Corr. 
(ART) 








































































































1-7 0.01 -0.74 .12 
 
Note: Significance codes: <.001 ***; <.01 **; <.05*. 
 
  




The kurtosis and skewness values of the main measures were all within the 
range of ±2 (see Table 2), indicating normality (George & Mallery, 2010) and 
providing the justification to proceed with our main analyses. 
 
Main Analyses6 
 The dataset was submitted to a one-way ANCOVA with ART as the 
dependent variable, Group (global, local or control) as the independent 
variable, and NFC as the covariate. The interaction term NFC × Group was 
not statistically significant, F(2, 110) = 0.65, p = .53, fulfilling the 
homogeneity of slopes assumption. Group was found to be significant, F(2, 
112) = 4.53, p = .013, suggesting that some groups differed in terms of their 
academic risk taking. We then proceeded to conduct three sets of planned 
comparisons.  
We first compared the global and local groups. Consistent with our 
prediction, globally-focused individuals took significantly more academic risk 
than did locally-focused individuals after controlling for NFC, Msadj = 5.28 vs. 
4.30 respectively, F(1, 73) = 8.86, p = .0039, ηp2 = .11, and after controlling 
for NFC and the six covariates of non-interest (i.e., interest, readability, 
confidence, memory, engrossment, and prior text knowledge), Msadj = 5.14 vs. 
4.44 respectively, F(1, 67) = 4.69, p = .034, ηp2 = .065. 
 
To ascertain which condition(s) may be driving the observed effect, we 
conducted two additional planned comparisons, one comparing the global with 
                                                          
6 Here, we applied the same outlier exclusion criteria as that used in Experiment 1. 
We did not, however, exclude any outliers eventually, as the conclusions before and 
after exclusion remained the same. We thusly reported the results of the complete 
dataset. 




control group, and another comparing the local with control group. Controlling 
for NFC, globally-focused participants did not differ from participants in the 
control group in terms of academic risk taking, Msadj = 5.21 vs. 4.88 
respectively, F(1, 75) = 1.03, p = .31, ηp2 = .014. This outcome remained the 
same after controlling for the six covariates of non-interest, Msadj = 5.13 vs. 
4.95 respectively, F(1, 69) = 0.30, p = .59, ηp2 = .0043. In contrast, locally-
focused participants took significantly lesser academic risk than did 
participants in the control group after controlling for NFC, Msadj = 4.37 vs. 
4.98 respectively, F(1, 75) = 4.20, p = .044, ηp2 = .053. This effect persisted 
even after controlling for the six covariates of non-interest, Msadj = 4.36 vs. 
4.99 respectively, F(1, 69) = 4.29, p = .042, ηp2 = .058. 
The present experiment is an extension of Experiment 1, wherein a 
task-based measure of academic risk taking was employed, for the purpose 
that effects of the global-local processing manipulation, if any, may be more 
readily observable. Consistent with our hypothesis, our findings corroborated 
those from Experiment 1: globally-focused individuals took more academic 
risk relative to locally-focused individuals, after controlling for their NFC. 
Additionally, comparisons with the control group revealed that locally-focused 
participants drove the observed effects.  
 
General Discussion 
In two experiments, we investigated the influence of global-local processing 
styles on students’ academic risk taking. Preliminary effects that obtained 
using a perception-based measure (Experiment 1) were confirmed via the use 
of a task-based measure of academic risk taking (Experiment 2). Consistent 




with our hypothesis, globally-focused individuals took more academic risk 
than did locally-focused individuals, after taking into account their NFC.  
The theory of PARCS (Tops et al., 2010, 2014; see Introduction) 
provides a cogent account of the present findings. Recapitulating, the human 
cognition comprises two broad control systems. The predictive control system 
is dominant under benign circumstances, and is concerned with growth and 
advancement. On the other hand, the reactive control system prevails under 
threatening circumstances, and is concerned with security and vigilance. 
Global processing is associated with the predictive control system, and is 
likely to favour growth-promoting behaviors. Conversely, local processing is 
associated with the reactive control system, and is likely to favour vigilant 
behaviors. In accord with the theory of PARCS, the present study 
demonstrated that globally-focused individuals indeed took more academic 
risk than did locally-focused individuals, whilst controlling for NFC.  
The exact mechanism underpinning the observed effects deserves 
further attention. In particular, global processing has been associated with a 
promotion focus, whereas local processing has been associated with a 
prevention focus (Förster & Higgins, 2005). Global (vs. local) processing may 
have induced a promotion (vs. prevention) focus, which may in turn lead to 
differential academic risk taking behaviors (see, also, Lim et al., 2015). 
Alternatively, it is plausible that global and local processing may have 
activated distinct goal pursuits (e.g., goal to explore vs. goal to conserve; see 
Liberman, Förster, & Friedman, 2007), which translate as differences in 
academic risk taking behaviors. Another alternative perspective pertains to the 
relationship between global-local processing and uncertainty intolerance. 




Caparos et. al. (2014) suggested correlational (but not causal) relationships 
between global-local processing and uncertainty intolerance. Since academic 
risk taking involves an element of uncertainty, global-local processing could 
have induced differences in uncertainty intolerance, which could in turn have 
affected students’ risk-taking tendencies. Future studies should directly 
investigate these hypotheses, in order to elucidate the nature of relationship 
between processing styles and academic risk taking more fully. Other related 
variables (e.g., emotions, temporal focus) can also be investigated in 
conjunction with academic risk taking, in order to enable a better 
understanding of how risk taking can be encouraged in an academic setting.  
Despite the obtained findings, the effect sizes in both experiments are 
very small. This may suggest that students’ academic risk taking tendencies 
may be minimally influenced by an immediate, transient state i.e., global-local 
processing. This remains to be further tested. A peripheral observation is that 
the effects in Experiment 1 (ηp2 = .029 before outlier exclusion; ηp2 = .086 
after outlier exclusion) were relatively weaker than were those in Experiment 
2 (ηp2 = .11), which may shed new light on the existing priming literature (see 
Loersch & Payne, 2011; Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2014 for reviews). 
There is preliminary evidence to suggest that the effects of priming may be 
more robust and observable in a task involving real actions and consequences 
(Experiment 2) than in one involving merely hypothetical choices (Experiment 
1). Future priming studies may expound on task type as a potential moderator.  




Implications for Education 
The present study is among the first to investigate academic risk taking 
in college students. Based on our measures, college students tended to express 
above-average academic risk taking tendencies, M = 4.77, SD = 1.36 
(Experiment 1); M = 4.84, SD = 1.54 (Experiment 2). Our findings contrast 
with those documented in previous studies, which often reported below-
average academic risk taking among elementary students (see Clifford, 1991). 
One interpretation for the relatively high academic risk taking in our sample 
relates to the ecological validity of the current academic risk taking measures 
(e.g., participants might have been more willing to take academic risks when 
there were no real consequences involved), although this explanation is 
problematic given that the current measures were similar to those used in 
previous studies (e.g., Clifford, 1991). A second interpretation relates to the 
nature of our sample – students who eventually made it to college could be 
higher academic risk takers. Future research should test the latter possibility in 
particular.  
Notably, in Experiment 2, only locally-focused, but not globally-
focused, individuals differed from the control group in terms of academic risk 
taking. This finding is consistent with Lim et al.’s (2015) observation, 
suggesting that global focus may be the default mode of focus. The insight is 
that college students’ default academic predisposition may well be an 
adventurous one. The question may, then, relate not so much to how to 
promote academic risk taking tendencies per se, but instead, to how not to 
stifle these default tendencies to take healthy academic risks. This has critical 




implications for the ways in which educators and stakeholders ought to rethink 
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Text (Experiment 1) 
Tropisms 
 Growing plants can respond to a stimulus coming from a given 
direction by growing more rapidly on one side than the other and hence 
bending toward or away from the stimulus. This growth response in plants is 
defined as a tropism. Tropisms can occur only in those parts of the plant that 
are growing and elongating, such as the plant stem or root. For example, a 
plant left on a window sill will gradually grow so that the stems bend toward 
the light source. The bending of the stems occurs because the cells on the 
nonlighted side grow more rapidly than those facing the light. The particular 
chemical responsible for this growth is called an auxin.  
 Tropisms are named for the kind of stimuli eliciting them. A 
phototropism is a growth response to light. The plant on the window sill 
described above is a good example of a phototropic response. Geotropism is a 
growth response to gravity. The root of a plant is geotropic because it grows 
toward the force of gravity. Two other forms of tropism are chemotropism (a 
growth response to some chemical) and thigmotropism (a growth response to 
contact). Bean plants are famous for their thigmotropism. Once contact is 
made with the top of a bean stem, it curls, producing the clinging response 
typically found in these plants.  
A tropic growth may be either positive (toward the stimulus) or 
negative (away from the stimulus). For example, a seed always grows with the 
root downward and the stem upward. Thus, the root is positively geotropic and 
the stem is negatively geotropic. 
 
  







1. Approximate number of time(s) you read passage in the five minutes: 
___________ 
Section B 
Please select the option that best describes your judgements of the passage. 
 
2. How interesting was the passage?  
Very boring  -----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7----- Very interesting 
 
3. How readable was the passage?  
Very difficult 
to read  
-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7----- Very easy to 
read 
  
4. How confident are you on this passage? 
Not very 
confident  
-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7----- Very  
confident 
 
5. How well do you think you would be able to remember the passage after 
five minutes?  
Not very well  -----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7----- Very well 
 
6. How engrossed were you in reading the passage? 
Not very 
engrossed  
-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7----- Very  
engrossed 
 




-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7----- Very  
much 
 
8. How well did you know the subject matter covered in the passage, prior to 
reading the passage? 
Not very well  -----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7----- Very well 



























Need for Cognition Scale 
You will be asked general questions NOT related to the tasks that you just 
performed. Hence, please answer them as you would on a GENERAL basis. 






I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
Thinking is not my idea of fun.* 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that 
is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.* 
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will 
have to think in depth about something.* 
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.    
I only think as hard as I have to.* 
I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.* 
I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.* 
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to 
problems. 
Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.* 
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that 
is somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a 
lot of mental effort.* 
It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or 
why it works.* 
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
*indicates negatively-worded items 
 






We adopted Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Joo’s (2013) broad 
recommendations in identifying and handling outliers in our data set. 
Specifically, we established converging evidence from various diagnostics: 
studentized residuals, leverage values, and Cook’s distance (see Bollen & 
Jackman, 1990 for a comprehensive review). In the following section, we 
briefly delineate these diagnostics before reporting the cases deemed to be 
influential.  
The studentized residual, r, represents how much an observation, 
relative to others, deviates from the predicted dependent variable, i.e., ART. 
The leverage value, h, indicates how much an observation deviates from the 
mean of the predictor, i.e., NFC. While these two diagnostics provide an 
indication of an observation’s influence, looking at either one alone is 
insufficient (Bollen & Jackman, 2010). Cook’s distance, D, is typically used to 
assess the joint influence of the above two diagnostics. It assigns a numerical 
value to the influence an observation had on the overall model fit. Adjusting 
for our sample size (N = 69), observations with D higher than 4/N = 0.058 
were considered influential (Bollen & Jackman, 2010). Five influential cases 
were flagged based on this criterion, and were excluded from our analysis. 
These influential cases, together with their diagnostic values, are presented in 
Table 3. To aid interpretation of the relative influence these cases had over 
other observations, an Influence Plot is also presented in Figure 4. 
  




Table 3.  
 
Influential cases and their outlier diagnostics. 
 







1 Local 7.00 4.00 2.99 .047 0.15 
2 Local 5.00 3.50 1.62 .074 0.071 
3 Local 1.00 3.22 -1.98 .095 0.14 
4 Global 1.33 3.56 -2.32 .047 0.089 













Note: Means (and standard deviations) of the diagnostics are presented for 
reference. 




Figure 4. Influence Plot of observations’ Studentized residuals against 
Leverage (Hat-values). Cook’s distance is represented by, and proportional to, 
circle size. Vertical reference lines are drawn at twice and three times the 









Text (Experiment 2) 
Is Science Dangerous? 
Adapted from Wolpert, L. (2002). Is science dangerous? Journal of Molecular Biology, 319(4), 969-972. 
The idea that scientific knowledge is dangerous is deeply embedded in our 
culture. Adam and Eve were forbidden to eat from the Tree of Knowledge, and 
in Milton's Paradise Lost the serpent addresses the tree as the 'Mother of 
Science'. Indeed the whole of western literature has not been kind to scientists 
and is filled with images of them meddling with nature with disastrous results. 
Just consider Shelley's Frankenstein, Goethe's Faust and Huxley's Brave New 
World. One will search with very little success for a novel in which scientists 
come out well – the persistent image is that of scientists as a soulless group 
unconcerned with ethical issues. And where is there a film sympathetic to 
science? 
Part of the problem is the conflation of science and technology. The 
distinction between science and technology, between knowledge and 
understanding on the one hand and the application of that knowledge to making 
something, or using it in some practical way, is fundamental. 
Science produces ideas about how the world works, whereas the ideas in 
technology result in usable objects. Technology is much older than anything 
one could regard as science and unaided by any science. Technology gave rise 
to the crafts of early humans, like agriculture and metalworking. It is technology 
that carries with it ethical issues, from motorcar production to cloning a human. 
By contrast, reliable scientific knowledge is value-free and has no moral or 
ethical value. Science merely tells us how the world is. That we are not at the 
centre of the universe is neither good nor bad, nor is the possibility that genes 
can influence our intelligence or our behaviour. 
The social obligations that scientists have as distinct from those 
responsibilities they share with all citizens comes from them having access to 
specialised knowledge of how the world works not easily accessible to others. 
Their obligation is to both make public any social implications of their work 
and its technological applications and to give some assessment of its reliability. 
It is not easy to find examples of scientists as a group behaving immorally 
or in a dangerous manner – the classic was the eugenics movement. The 
scientific assumptions behind this proposal are crucial; the assumption is that 
most desirable and undesirable human attributes are inherited. Not only was 
talent perceived of as being inherited, but so too were insanity and any kind of 




so-called feeblemindedness. They completely failed to give an assessment of 
the reliability of their ideas. Quite the contrary, and even more blameworthy, 
their conclusions seem to have been driven by what they saw as the desirable 
social implications. By contrast, in relation to the building of the atomic bomb, 
scientists behaved morally and fulfilled their social obligations by informing 
their governments about the implications of atomic theory. It was an enormous 
engineering feat to build the bomb but the decision to do this was taken by 
politicians, not scientists. 
The moralists have been out in force telling us of the horrors of cloning. 
Many others, national leaders included, have joined in a chorus of horror. But 
what horrors? What ethical issues? In all the righteous indignation not a single 
relevant new ethical issue has been spelled out. 
Those who propose to clone a human are medical technologists not 
scientists. It is not, as the bio-moralists claim, that scientific innovation has 
outstripped our social and moral codes. Just the opposite is the case. Their 
obsession with the life of the embryo has deflected our attention away from the 
real issue, which is how the babies that are born are raised and nurtured. The 
ills in our society have nothing to do with assisting or preventing reproduction 
but are profoundly affected by how children are treated. 
So what danger does genetics pose? Gene therapy, introducing genes to cure 
a genetic disease like cystic fibrosis, carries risks, as do all new medical 
treatments. There may well be problems with the testing of new treatments, but 
are these difficulties any different from those related to trying out new drugs for 
AIDS? Anxieties about creating designer babies are at present premature as it 
is far too risky, and we may have, in the first instance, to accept what has been 
called procreative autonomy: a couple's right to control their own role in 
reproduction unless the state has a compelling reason for denying them that 
control. Should the ethical issues relating to the applications of genetics, for 
example, lead to stopping research in this field? The individual scientist cannot 
decide, for science, like genetics, is a collective activity with no single 
individual controlling the process of discovery. It is ethically unacceptable and 
impractical to censor any aspect of trying to understand the nature of our world. 
  





Text Questions (Experiment 2) 




Do the following statements agree with the information given in the Text?  
Write 
TRUE if the statement is true according to the passage 
FALSE if the statement is false according to the passage 
NOT 
GIVEN 
if the information is not given in the passage 
1) The film industry does not make films about science.  FALSE 
 
2) Scientists do not work in unison when deciding what needs to be 
researched.  FALSE 
 
3) Parents want to have cloned children now.  NOT GIVEN 
 
4) Technology was important before the development of science.  TRUE 
 
5) Many people consider cloning to be undesirable.  TRUE 
 
6) Science and Technology must be seen as separate entities.  TRUE 
 
Question 7 
Choose NO MORE THAN TWO WORDS from the passage for your answer. 
What influenced the eugenics movement when they were summarizing the 
findings of their research? 7) ............. (desirable) social implications 





Choose ONE phrase from the list of phrases A - H below to complete each of 
the following sentences. 
List of Phrases 
A work in groups in an unethical way  
В was responsible for helping to develop basic trades and skills  
С scientists are portrayed as being irreligious  
D does not make moral judgements  
E become involved in hazardous research  
F scientists are seen to interfere with nature  
G does not help us to understand how the world works  
H is more concerned with ethics than research  
 
8) In literature   F 
 
9) Technology  B 
 
10) Science  D 
 
11) Rarely do scientists  A 
 
Question 12 
Choose the best answer А, В, С or D. 
 
12) According to the writer, Science shows us 
 A our position in the universe.  
 B how intelligence affects our behavior.  
 C what the world is really like. ✓  









School Failure Tolerance Scale 







I feel terrible when I make a mistake in school. 
If I do poorly in my school work, I try not to let anyone know. 
A low mark in my school work makes me feel very sad. 
When I start something new in school, the first thing I think about is that I 
might fail. 
I worry a lot about making errors in my school work. 
I feel like hiding whenever I get a bad mark in school. 
If I make lots of mistakes in school, I feel very moody or angry. 
I don't like to study with friends because they may think I am dumb if I 
don’t know something. 
When I fail at something in school, I don't like to eat, or play, or talk, or do 
anything. 
I get very discouraged if I make errors on a task I am trying to learn. 
I really dislike school work on which I make mistakes. 
If I give a wrong answer to a tutor's question, I feel terrible. 
 
Preferred Difficulty 
I like to do school work that is difficult for me. 
I would rather work problems I can do in a hurry than those that take much 
time and thought.* 
I would do almost anything to get out of working difficult problems in 
school.* 
I like to try difficult assignments even if I get some wrong. 
School work that really makes me think is fun. 
School work that is difficult is more fun than school work that is easy. 
I would rather study a difficult module (course) than an easy one. 




If I could choose my math problems, I would pick hard ones rather than 
easy ones. 
It is fun to try to answer questions that are difficult or challenging. 
The easier school work is for me, the more I like it.* 
I like to study with friends who enjoy working on difficult lessons. 
I would rather make mistakes on a difficult task than get a perfect score on 
an easy but boring task.  
 
Action 
I like to ask questions in school because I learn by asking questions. 
If I cannot succeed at a new school task, I give up quickly.* 
When I make mistakes in my school work, I just keep trying and trying. 
I don't like to set goals for my school work, because I might not reach them 
and then I feel bad.* 
If a school task is difficult, I try to get by without doing it.* 
If I do not understand something, I ask the tutor (teacher) to explain it. 
I would rather guess at something and get it wrong than ask a question that 
may sound silly.* 
I almost always learn a lot from the mistakes I make in my school work. 
If I get a low grade in my school work, I study my errors and rework the 
problems I get wrong. 
I usually study and correct the errors I make on school work, even if I don’t 
have to. 
I don't like to set goals for my school work. I just do the work and forget 
about it.* 
If I get a low score, I usually make up my mind to buckle down and study 
hard. 
*indicates negatively-worded items 
Note: Words in parentheses came from the original scale, but were replaced 












ANOVA models across Experiments.  
Source 
Mean 
F (df1, df2) p ηp2 




4.71 4.84 - 0.16 (1, 67) .69 .0024 
Expt. 1  
(after outlier 
removal) 
4.93 4.86 - .022 (1, 62) .88 .00035 
Expt. 2 
(overall) 












5.16 - 4.93 .44 (1, 76) .51 .0058 
 
Excepting the global vs. local group comparison in Experiment 2, all 
ANOVA models did not yield any significant differences in ART across 
different experimental groups. This highlights the importance of taking NFC 
into account when investigating students’ academic risk taking. Indeed, NFC 
was found to share moderate correlations with students’ academic risk taking 
in both experiments (r = .62 in Experiment 1; r = .39 in Experiment 2;). 
Interpreted intuitively, students’ dispositional, motivational tendencies 
towards academic challenge (i.e., NFC) may have a relatively large amount of 
influence over temporally-activated cognitive processes (i.e., global-local 
processing), such that the effects of global-local processing are only obtained 
after taking NFC into account. Future studies investigating academic risk 
taking may also want to control for students’ NFC. Moreover, future studies 
should continue to assess whether the effects of global-local processing can be 
observed without controlling for students NFC.  
